A critical time in
geography came during the 1950s, when the quantitative revolution changed how
people thought of it. Prior to this,
regional geography had been the dominant mode of study in the field. What inspired the change was an insecurity
about geography being relevant in a changing world, which in academia was
placing higher value on the sciences than the humanities. The Quantitative Revolution introduced
scientific methods to the discipline of geography, enticing theorists with
grandiose propositions about spatial laws that could be interpreted as
universal and general. This appealed to
many geographers because it promised to make the subject more prestigious as it
became more scientific.
There were several critiques of regional geography that
took place during this period. One was
that its generalizations about regions were not consistent enough (Johnston and
Sidaway 2004: 58) to support further research.
Too much information about regions was being presented with too many
discrepancies in the facts. Another was
that too many regions that were being documented lacked the true vividness,
flavor, or personality of the cultures embodying them, such as West Africa
(Johnson and Sidaway 2004: 58). Furthermore,
there was disagreement by geographers on what regions entailed, and where their
boundaries lay. Without clearly defined
boundaries, the revolution in spatial science allowed for a shift in
perspective that made research in geography more rigorous, with the intention
of better approximating regions or doing away with them altogether. This new research would involve more quantitative
methods based on spatial laws than the previous qualitative methods of regional
geography.
Part of the issue had to do with the range of study
geography is involved with. In Harvey’s Explanation
of Geography, he states that “in physical geography law-statements are
important, but in human geography such statements are irrelevant” (Harvey 1969:
69). A spatial science of the physical
world has been appropriate since the roots of geographic study, back when
Eratosthenes (3rd c. BC) first measured the circumference of the
Earth and proposed grid-like systems of measurement like the longitude and
latitude we know today. Human geography
is far more nebulous than physical geography.
It allows for loosely defined concepts of regions to be described by
particular sets of data. Because of the
multivariate nature of human geography, it is difficult to prove social laws
based on the scientific method or statistical analysis (Harvey, 1969: 76). With physical geography, there was already an
appropriate system for deducing scientific knowledge, which is what the spatial
scientists of the Quantitative Revolution were seeking. Extending this concept to human and regional
geography was an ambitious goal that did not seem entirely out of reach at the
time.
A key figure in the Quantitative Revolution was Fred
Schaefer. He was an empiricist who strongly
believed geographic research should be reformed using quantitative
methods. In his seminal paper Exceptionalism
in Geography…, he argued that since the major pattern-producing variables
in geography are spatial, laws could be used to predict their output through
determinism (Schaefer 1953). Ideally
this would apply to social laws as well as physical ones. As human and regional geography were limited
to descriptions (Schaefer 1953), they could never be taken as seriously as
other scientific fields if they didn’t primarily use quantifiable data. To Schaefer, it was only through analytical and
statistical methods that facts could be gathered to deduce spatial laws. He believed that geographers needed to
embrace science to improve the integrity and prestige of the field, so that
more research opportunities would become available from higher universities
like Harvard, which had disbanded its geography program in 1948 for being too
focused on regions.
William Bunge expanded on Schaefer’s ideas to include
mathematical modeling as a cornerstone of regional analysis and cartography. To Bunge, regions should be assigned by
aerial classification based on what actual data suggests (Bunge 1962: 20), not
by arbitrarily describing them. This
placed more value on the study of geography because models can better predict
what happens in any given region. Bunge
also elaborated on the statistical diffusion of movement, explaining how human
activities tend to show patterns by optimizing distance (Bunge 1962: 211). Such optimization leads to a geometric
interpretation of activity, which can more easily be applied to cartography as
a spatial structure (Bunge 1962: 212). Thus,
it became evident that cartographers could use modeling to enhance their maps
by coding or iterating sets of data, resulting in spatial transformations that
more accurately described regions. Later
in the century, computers would demonstrate this in action after Geographic
Information Systems were developed.
As universal laws began to describe movement in
geography, so did they describe physical processes, with more accurate results. Arthur Strahler, a pioneer in geomorphology,
subscribed to the idea that mathematical modeling could determine the general
laws that created landforms. (Strahler 1952: 936). He stressed that geographers were behind scientists
in other fields because of the lack in using equations, models, and dynamic
systems in their research (Strahler 1952: 937).
Geomorphology- the study of physical features on earth related to
geology- arose from applying these quantitative methods to physical geography. But crucially, the human side of geography,
best described by movement and agency, was not addressed by him. A similar field might have arisen that
applied to human geography, but since humans are less predictable than natural
processes, one never developed.
Instead,
there were a number of reactionary movements against the Quantitative
Revolution from a human perspective, rendering most of its appeal to physical
geographers. In the 1970s and 1980s, humanist,
Marxist, feminist, postmodern and poststructuralist geographers sequentially shifted
the focus back on agency as it applied to the individual or society, addressing
the power structures that the Quantitative Revolution was ignoring. These reactionary movements also shifted the
focus back to quantitative research, which is why geography is still seen as a
social science today.
While
the reactionary movements had valid points, the shortcomings of the Quantitative
Revolution need not distract them from its crucial contribution to human and
regional geography. As most human
activity can be approximated by mathematical models, it became useful for cartographers
to use spatial laws in depicting human relationships, even those involving
power structures. For instance, a cartographer could model the
behavior seen in one type of governed society vs. another, making a stronger
argument for disparities in social relationships. That was the point Schaefer and Bunge were
making; social behavior that can be statistically analyzed using quantitative
methods supports a stronger argument in the hard sciences than qualitative data
does in the soft sciences. Their mistake
was leaning too heavily on the universal, which seemed to reduce human structures
to a mechanized, predictable set of behaviors- ominously similar to
environmental determinism. By adopting
the universal appeal of Strahler’s geomorphology and discarding Harvey’s view
that social laws were too multivariate to be proven, they mistakenly placed too
much importance on quantifying behavior.
Given a set of parameters, humans don’t always act the same way, whether
they are in groups or as individuals.
The
spatial scientists of the Quantitative Revolution were too concerned with
prestige to see that geography is a marriage of physical and social sciences;
that you can’t ignore the human component, or a divorce causes it to crumble. Because regions are mostly defined by the
boundaries humans create, agency will always be part of the “equation”. Regions can’t be ignored for the same reason;
they are most appropriate at conveying information about places, whether it is
physical or human. Adopting quantitative
methods to geographic research was important for the field, but the ambitious drive
to find universal spatial laws seemed like an overreaction to a single university’s
rejection (Harvard). By more subtly
integrating quantitative methods, the movements that followed might have been
more comprehensive than reactionary.
References:
Bunge, W.W. (1962) Theoretical Geography, Royal
University, Lund.
Harvey, D. (1969) Explanation in Geography, Edward
Arnold, London.
Johnston,
R.D. and Sidaway, J.D (2004) Geography and Geographers: Anglo-American Human Geography
Since 1945, Arnold, London.
Schaefer,
F.K. (1953) Exceptionalism in geography: a methodological examination. Annals
of the Association of American Geographers, 43, 226-249.
Strahler,
A.N. (1952) Dynamic basis of geomorphology. Bulletin of the Geological
Society of America, 63, 923-938.
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